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2 The City of London and the British
government: the changing relationship
Ranald Michie
An unchanging relationship between unchanging parmers: this is how
the relationship between the City of London and the British government
has tended to be painted. Although this simplification aids interpretation
of a long time period, it also distorts understanding. There was nothing
constant about either the government or the City during the twentieth
century, and so it would be remarkable if the relationship between the two
did not change. Government was transformed during the century, emerg-
ing as the dominant force within British economic and social life. The
City of London was also transformed as it shed its commercial and impe-
rial past to focus on finance and Europe. Under these circumstances the
relationship between the City and government could not remain static.
At the same time both existed within, and had to adapt to, a global econ-
omy that forced changes as a result of two world wars, a world depression
and the rise and fall of managed national economies. lb.is chapter seeks
to trace and understand the City-government relationship over the past
three centuries, focusing particularly on its intensity, and on the direction
and limits of influence.
The origins of the relationship, 1700-1914
The City of London's leading institutions owed their very existence to
the financial needs of the British government. The Bank of England was
established in 1694 in response to the government's borrowing predica-
ment, while the founding of the London Stock Exchange in 1802 was an
attempt to create an organised market for the National Debt at a time
of international conflict. The government relied on the City to provide
the money required to finance its expenditure, while the City relied on
the government for the business it generated. Such a murually dependent
relationship, with a high degree ofself-interest on both sides, underpinned
Britain's success as a military-fiscal state until the early nineteenth cen-
tury. The bankers, brokers and merchants of the City of London flour-
ished not only through supplying the government with the money and
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material required for successive wars, but also by obtaining from the gov-
ernment the security necessary for the successful conduct of business,
especially protection from the activities offoreign rivals through a strong
navy. However, in other respects eighteenth-century governments were
not especially helpful in furthering the City's interests. Attempts to con-
trol the promotion of joint-stock companies and to restrict the trading
of shares left the City trying either to circumvent state controls through
a system of self-regulation, as with the Stock Exchange, or to provide
its own remedies for gaps in the financial and monetary system resulting
from government failure, as in the supply and use of money. From this
perspective the dominant parmer in the relationship was the government.
During the nineteenth century the government-City relationship
became less intense, though more ambiguous. Following the re-
introduction of income tax in 1844, governments had a relatively secure
source ofincome that increased in amount as the nation's prosperity grew.
As most governments ran balanced budgets, they had no need to borrow.
The national debt ceased to grow and the proportion of government rev-
enue required to service it fell from 54 per cent in 1830 to II per cent
by 1913. This freed whatever political party was in power from depen-
dence on the City. The government could even take the step in 1888
of reducing the interest paid on the national debt, even though this
would displease many in the City. 1 Nor is there much real evidence
that in the half century before the First World War any government
paid particular mention to the City's wishes in framing domestic policy.
Taxes on both high-income earners and inherited wealth were hardly
City-inspired policies2 On the other hand, the City flourished under a
regime of benign neglect where finance and trade were little troubled
by intervention and controls either at home or abroad. With the end of
protection and abandonment of imperial preference, this was an era of
'caveat emptor' where the buyer and seller or investor and borrower were
left to take the consequences of their own actions, and where markets
and those who participated in them were self-regulated. There was no
dominant City view on issues such as protection or the gold standard,3
I R Bonney (ed.), The Riseo/the FisullSlate in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999), chs. by
O~rod,.O'~ric:n and ~Unt; D. Winch and P. K. O'Brien (eds.), The PolitUaJ 8:onomy of
Bmuh HuwrnaJ Expenenu, 1688-1914 (Oxford, 2002), chs. by O'Brien, Hoppit, Capie,
Daunton, Peden.
2 M. Daumon, Trusting Leviathan: the PolitU:.s o/Taxation in Bn"lain. /799-1914 (Cambridge,
2001), pp. 35,123,187,207,225,370,388.
] A. C. Howe, Free Trade and LiberoJ England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 13-16,232,
236; A. Marrison, Bn"lIsh Busi,less and ProlUtion, 1903-1932 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 19-20,
58, 7~, 112,204,429-31. However, for a contrasting view on the influence of City
fi~anC1cz:s on government currency policy, see T. Wilson, Bauks for the Standard:
BlnJeUJ1Jum and lJu Spread oflJu Gold Szandard in zhe Nineuenzh Cmzury (Aldershol, 2000),
pp.20, 175-6.
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although due to the lack of an alternative source of economic exper-
tise, bankers, brokers and financial journalists from the City pro-
vided expert individual opinion on financial, commercial and monetary
matters.
The one aspect of government policy with which the City has been
positively identified is expansion of the Empire, and the additional oppor-
tunities this created for trade and, especially, investment. Those assumed
to have been driving this were the 'gendemanly capitalists' of the City,
a wealthy elite combining the twin pursuits of southern landowner and
London financier who, divorced from the world of the northern industri-
alist, turned to the Empire as an oudet for their money and their talents'
However, it is difficult to discover much substance behind this interpre-
tation. Since the ending of imperial preference in 1860 the City focused
increasingly upon wider international trade and finance. Countries like
the United States, Argentina and Germany loomed large in the City's
financial and commercial activities, while much of the recendy acquired
Empire was of Iitde significance, apart from gold in South Africa and
rubber in Malaya. The Empire was not an issue which produced con-
certed City pressure on government. In the early rwentieth cenrury the
most pressing City concern was the prospect of war with Germany. The
City financed much of Germany's international trade, handled its capital
exports, employed its ships and insured its mercantile marine, to such a
degree that it was feared that a war would have disastrous consequences.
Had the City been able to exert real influence over government policy
before the First World War, then either there would have been no war
with Germany, or else measures would have been taken to safeguard the
City from its consequences. 5 As neither was achieved, it is difficult to
make a case that government policy before 1914 was particularly respon-
sive to City influence.
The disengagement berween the government and the City in the rune-
teenth century was not just on the side ofgovernment, for the City became
less dependent on the government for business. Though the Bank of
England remained pre-eminent, playing a unique role as the banker's
bank, by the early rwentieth cenrury other banks came to rank alongside it
in size and importance, particularly the five major joint-stock banks which
from London head offices dominated banking in Britain. Numerous other
smaller banks were also important in that they provided banking nerworks
around the world or were engaged in specialised services within the City
itself. The Stock Exchange no longer relied on the national debt as its
4 So< P. j. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, Briwh Imperialism, 2 vols. (1993).
5 D. French, Bn·tislt Economit: and SrraugK Planning, 1905-1915 (1992») pp. 68, 92-4;
P. Kennedy, SrraUl/IY and Dipwmacy, 1870---1945 (1989), pp. 94-6.
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main business. Instead, much of its activity was now focused on domestic
and foreign corporate securities, especially railways. Between 1853 and
1913 the national debt as a proportion of the value of securities quoted
on the Stock Exchange fell from 70 to II per cent. As a result, direct
government interests in the City were fairly low. The same was also true
regarding policy. Monetary policy was devolved to the Bank of England,
which operated under the requirements of the international gold stan-
dard, not at the behest of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There were
no exchange controls and capital moved in and out of the country in
response to the forces of global supply and demand. There were no bar-
riers to either expons or impons, enabling the City to occupy a position
at the centre of international trade. To most in the City the actions and
policies of the government were irrelevant.
A relationship in flux, 1914-1939
The cost, duration and intensity of the First World War had profound
consequences for both government and the City, immediately revers-
ing the nineteenth-century trend and restoring their mutual dependence.
From the very outbreak of the war government intervention in the City
was· required in order to prevent a financial collapse caused by a rush
to withdraw savings, which would have resulted in a massive contraction
in credit and widespread business failures 6 The government convened
a meeting of the banks, and declared a bank holiday to allow time for
emergency measures to be implemented and to inject extra liquidity into
the system. As hostilities dragged on the government was forced to con-
trol more and more of the economy in order to maximise resources for
the war effon, with government borrowing rising inexorably. Whereas the
quoted national debt of all kinds stood at £I billion in 1913 the figure
had more than quintupled to £5.4 billion by 1920, and the government's
share of all quoted securities had risen to 32 per cent compared to the
prewar level of9 per cent. In contrast the £2.5 billion ofquoted securities
belonging to American railroads was almost entirely liquidated by British
investors or requisitioned and sold by the government. The government's
shon-term borrowing through Treasury bills also dominated the London
money market both during the war itself and for long afterwards, in
6 For this episode sec J Peters, 'The British government and the City-industry divide:
~c .case of the ,1914 financial crisis', Twentieth Cenrury Bn'tish History 4 (1993), 126-48;
1. Scabournc, The summCT of 1914') in E Capie and G. E. Wood (cds.),FinancialCrises
and the WOrld BankingS)!scem (1986), pp. 77~116; also David Uoyd George, Wbr Memoirs,
I (1933), ch. emitled 'How we saved the City'.
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contrast to the earlier importance of commercial bills financing inter-
national trade.7
However, the connection between the City and the government was
far wider than that between lender and borrower. Wartime requirements
created a close working relationship which extended beyond the Bank of
England to other financial institutions. It was no coincidence that organ-
isations such as the Accepting Houses Association (1914) and the British
Bankers' Association (1919) date from this period, as these were a means
of coordinating the views and actions of their members in dealing with
the government. Government pressures now dominated the City. The
relationship was particularly close between the Treasury and the Bank of
England as they had the joint responsibility of continually re-financing
the national debt. In turn, that brought in the banks and the discount
houses, as the government's heavy borrowing had implications for the
London money market. It also extended to the Stock Exchange as new
issues there could interfere with the demand for government stock and
bills. Thus, simply on the financial front the government now had a major
interest in influencing what was happening in the City.
In addition, the government required the help of the City to achieve
other policy objectives. A return to the relative stability and prosperity of
the prewar years could not be achieved either quickly or without interven-
tion. The government could not aim for solvency and stability simply by
cutting its expenditure as it had done after the Napoleonic wars. Having
acquired wider social responsibilities before the First World War, such
as unemployment insurance and old age pensions, the government now
had to tackle the mass unemployment and economic dislocation following
the end of the short postwar boom, not least because of the political and
social consequences that would arise if it did not. The City-government
relationship forged as a result of the First .World War was not only much
more intense than in the past, but also more complicated.
During the) 920s the government made diverse and, at times, con-
flicting demands on the City, reflecting this more complex relationship.
For the first time these demands extended from the purely financial to
wider issues. Whether City banks continued to lend to firms in finan-
cial difficulties could affect the employment prospects of thousands of
people and the prosperity of whole regions. Whether the City resumed
its international lending could affect the supply and cost of finance within
Britain, the demand for British exports, relations with overseas countries,
7 Fo.. the City and governmenl during the war years sec E. V. Morgan) Studies in Bn"rish
Financial Policy /914-1925 (1952), and A. W. Kirkcaldy (cd.), Bn"mh Fina'Jce dun""g and
after/he ll:br, J9J4-2J (1921).
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and the international value of the pound. These issues were considered
too important to be left to the City itselfB Hence government inquiries
relating to the City now focused mucb less on market abuses, as in the
past, than on the problems of currency, foreign exchange, industry and
trade 9 In contrast, the priority among most in the City was simply to
see a return to the prewar position. A return to the gold standard in par-
ticular was regarded as having the twin benefits of stabilising the world
economy and restoring external demand for Britain's export trade, and
of forcing down domestic prices and wages and making industries com-
petitive. Return was also essential if the City were to maintain its position
as a global financial centre and re-capture what had been lost to New
York, as it would restore exchange-rate stability. The restoration of the
gold standard in 1925, at the prewar parity to the pound, has therefore
been seen as evidence of a victory for the City and a defeat for manufac-
turing industry and its need for a lower exchange rate in order to remain
competitive. Similarly, the abandonment in the 1920s of the temporary
measures taken to protect industry from foreign competition has also
been interpreted as a City victory, as it favoured those involved in the
organisation of international supply and demand rather than in the sale
or purchase of British manufactures. 10
However, neither the return to the gold standard nor the restoration of
free trade was a policy which the City collectively persuaded the govern-
ment to follow. A thriving foreign exchange market had developed quickly
.in the early I920s, which not only generated large profits for many in the
City but also provided a means ofavoiding exchange risk on transactions.
At the same time there was a growing number of City bankers and bro-
kers geared towards domestic business, who could expect to profit from
protection. With hindsight it has become clear that neither the gold stan-
dard nor a fixed exchange rate nor even sterling itselfwas essential for the
City's successful functioning as a global financial centre. However, such a
8 For the City and government between the wars see S. Howson, Domestu: Monetary Man-
agement in Bn"zain, J919-38 (Cambridge 1975); D. E. Moggridge, Bn"tish Monerary Policy,
1924-1931. The Norman Conquest of $4.86 (Cambridge, 1972); T. Balogh, Swdi£s in
Financial Organization (1947)j J. M. Atkin, Bn"fish Oveneas Inve.srmem, 1918-193/ (New
York, 1977); G. C. Peden, The Treasury and Publ;,; Policy, 1906--1959 (Oxford, 2000),
chs.4-6.
9 (Cunliffe) Cornmince on Currency and Foreign Exchange after the War1 Interim Report
(J 918), Final Report (1919); (Balfour) Comminee on Trade and Indusll')', Final RePOrt
10 (1929); (Macmillan) Comminee on Finance and Industry, RePOrt (1931). .
There IS a huge IItcrature on this subJect but see B. Eichengreen) 'International mone-
tary .instability between the wars: structural flaws or misguided policies?') in Y. Suzuki)
j. Mlyake and M. Okabe (cds.), The Evolurion ofthe International Monetary System (Tokyo)
19~0),? .IOS; F. H. Capic and G. E. Wood) 'Policy makers in crisis: a study ofrwo deval-
uatJons ,In D. R. Hodgman and G. E. Wood (cds.), Morrelary and Exchange Ra~Policy
(1987), p. 169.
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verdict was not clear to anyone in the 1920s, whether in the City, govern-
ment or elsewhere. Consequently, restoration of the gold standard was
considered inevitable, with only the timing to be decided upon. Similarly,
a return to free trade was thought inevitable, as those who had opposed
it had lost the debate before the war and those who supported it saw
no alternative, especially for the export industries. Preserving a domestic
market for manufacturing industries like cotton textiles and shipbuilding,
extractive industries like coal, or services like shipping, was of little value
when so much of their output was for foreign customers. As such it is
very difficult to see either the gold standard or free trade as specifically
City-inspired policies in the 1920s. Instead, they should be viewed as part
of the attempt to restore the pre-1914 conditions which the majority of
people simply assumed would re-appear in the near future.
Therefore, whatever the immediate consequences the First World War
had for City-government relations, it appears clear that the longer-term
intention was to pursue a policy of separation between the two, as in
the prewar period. Most City experts expected London to resume its
key role in international short- and long-term lending, though there was
a recognition of the enhanced role of New York. Throughout the City
there were attempts either to revive prewar global activities, such as the
finance of international trade, or to replace what had been lost with other
overseas activities, such as lending to central Europe. At the very least
there was always imperial lending to fall back upon, with Australia in
particular re-emerging as a major borrower. There was certainly no sign
in the 1920s that the City had resigned itself to a domestic role or even
an imperial one. The creation of the most important foreign-exchange
market in the world after 1922 was evidence of the City's continuing
global ambitions and its capacity to achieve them.
The City's influence has also been detected in the decision to leave the
gold standard in 1931. There is the view that the 1929-31 Labour govern-
ment was brought down by its attempts to reconcile maintenance of the
gold standard, at the behest of the City, with the requisite cuts in public
expenditure which it was unwilling to make at a time of high unemploy-
ment. In contrast, the National government that replaced it abandoned
the link to gold without the disastrous consequences for the country that
had been predicted in the City. In retrospect it appears clear that no gov-
ernment between the wars, whether Labour or Conservative, was willing
to take the domestic measures necessary to maintain the international
value of sterling. II The collapse of the gold standard in 1931 was not
11 s. v. O. Clarke, Cerl/nll Bank Co-operalion, 1924-31 (New York. 1967), p_ 201. For the
political and policy aspects, sec P. Williamson, NalJOnal Grisis and National GotJIc!Ttrnu!nL
Bn-rish Politics, the &onomy and Empi.., 1926---1932 (Cambridge, 1992), c:hs. 8-11.
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engineered by the City but was forced on the government by the inter-
national economic situation and a self-fulfilling collapse of confidence
in sterling. With the pound long regarded as overvalued and evidence
appearing that the Bank of England lacked the resources to defend it, it
was only a maner of time before Britain abandoned the gold standard
and the fixed rates of exchange this required.
It is impossible to see the sterling crisis of 1931 as anything another
than a defeat for the City, or at least for the internationally orientated
element of it that had been so prominent before the First World War. It
resulted in an even closer relationship between the government and the
City. Through protection, imperial preference, and currency interven-
tion the government was now in a strong position to influence the City's
international connections, while the size and character of the national
debt continued to give it a powerful voice in domestic financial markets.
However, the government did not take on responsibility for the man-
agement of the economy, government borrowing remained low, budgets
were balanced, and the management of the exchange rate was given to a
quasi-autonomous department in a still independent Bank of England.
Consequently, the government was neither in a position to direct the
City's banks and markets nor did it want to do so. What had changed was
the relationship with the Bank of England, which increasingly became an
arm of the state rather than the representative of the City. The Governor
of the Bank had become a permanent official, rather than a senior person
.seconded from the City for two years, while the Deputy Governor was
now drawn from among the staff of the Bank. 12
Apart from the Bank of England, and those areas of the City closely
involved in government finance such as the discount market, much of
the rest of the City did not come under the control of the state. At the
same time City firms adjusted their business to the new conditions. A
growing number of merchants, banks and brokers now serviced areas of
the domestic economy that benefited from protection or imperial pref-
erence. 13 Though a focus on traditional industries like textiles and ship-
building has suggested a fundamental City-industry divide in terms of
finance, evidence for such a structural problem is largely absent in the
1930s. Understandable caution was exercised by banks that had lost
money through poorly performing loans to industrial companies in the
I920s, although they had lime choice but to continue lending to such cus-
tomers as there were few alternative borrowers. At the same time invest-
ment banks and stock-broking firms were eager to make money by issuing
12 1'. Arnold, The Ba"lun of Londo" (1938), pp. 14-1 S.
IJ Howe, Free Trade, pp. 286-8; Marrison, En'fish Business Gnd Proteccion) p. 403.
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shares for businesses in expanding areas. Nevertheless, the 1930s were a
difficult period for the City, with the decline ofinternational trade, finance
and services only partly compensated for by lending to such sectors as
domestic house-building, retailing and consumer electrical goods or the
growth of new activities like motor insurance and instalment credit. 14
Generally for the 1930s there is a lack of evidence suggesting much direct
influence of the City over government policy, whether foreign or domes-
tic, while the apparent immunity of the City to economic conditions was
but an illusion.
The era of government ascendancy, 1939-1979
The real transformation of City-government relations came in the after-
math of the Second World War, when it mattered nor only what policies
the government followed, as these now had profound implications for eco-
nomic and social life, but also whether the Conservatives or Labour were
in power, as each pursued a different agenda and were i!1f1uenced by dif-
ferent pressure groups. The Second World War itself had much the same
immediate implications for City-government relations as the First. As the
government sought to mobilise and monopolise all resources for its own
ends, so the markets of the City were either closed or marginalized, banks
were converted into collecting agencies for government funds, and City
personnel either volunteered for or were directed into war work. With the
direction of labour, rationing of essential food and clothing, compulsory
savings, state control of production, rigid supervision of international
transactions through ministries, boards and other government bodies,
the planned economy came into being~ The City was largely superseded.
The government was now responsible for national distribution and sav-
ings and external commercial and financial relations. Whereas previously
the government had acted through the City to obtain what it wanted,
during the Second World War it set up its own systems, though draw-
ing upon City expertise and contacts in the process. A crude measure
of this transformation is the fact that the share of public expenditure in
toral national expenditure doubled during the war, rising from 28 to 56
per cent. 15
When the war ended in 1945 the wartime apparatus of state was not
immediately dismantled. Unlike the period after the First World War
14 For the City at lhis time see R Roberts, 'The City or London as a fmandal centre in the
era of the Depression, the Second World War and post-war official conrrols', in A. Gorst,
L. Jolmman and W. S. Lucas (eds.), Comemporary Bn"fish Hiswry, 1931-61 (1991).
1~ R. Middlc(on, GavernmenI venus the MarkeL The Growth of the Public Secw" Economic
Managememana British &onomic hrjormancc, c. 1890--1979 (Cheltenham, 1996), p. 418.
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there was no prewar era of stability and prosperity to try to revive. A
repeat of the mass unemployment and international tension of the 1930s
was highly unattractive. What appealed to most was the planning that
had brought success in the war and could now be applied to a peacetime
economy. A rational economic underpinning of such a philosophy lay in
th.. writings of Keynes, who argued that a greater degree of government
control over the economy produced 'a better outcome for all than if it was
left entirely to the market. There was also the social programme outlined
by Beveridge, promising to deliver a better furure to the victorious British
people. The Labour party's own agenda included a large extension of
public ownership and state direction of the economy. This was a potent
mixrure, and with the election ofa Labour government in 1945 a majority
of the British public expressed its support for the package of measures
on offer. Nevertheless, a complete takeover by the state of all private
enterprise and private wealth was not proposed. There remained a role
for the City of London.
In implementing its programme, the postwar Labour government
relied increasingly on the advice of professional economists rather than
the practising bankers and brokers of the City.'6 Wartime controls such
as rationing were retained, and the power of the state was progressively
extended through nationalisation. The Bank of England became an arm
of government in 1946 while the railways, coal mining, gas, electricity,
water and, evenrually, iron and steel were all nationalised, giving the gov-
ernment a direct voice in financial and monetary matters. Taken with the
wholesale disposal of foreign securities during and shortly after the war,
much of what the London capital market had formerly been engaged in
was now lost, leaving little beyond the issue of and trading in the national
debt in all its forms. A similar siruation prevailed in the money market
where meeting the short-term needs of government through the issue of
Treasury bills was now totally dominant. In the late 1940s the government
consolidated its wartime power to take full control over the economy. In
terms of its external relations there was the maintenance of exchange and
trade controls, imperial preference, the sterling area and intergovernment
financial flows. In terms of the domestic economy the government now
owned large parts ofit and was in a position to direct the rest. The City had
lirtle alternative but to accept the position and work within it, conscious
that the government could easily extend its nationalisation programme
to the major banks and insurance companies or even take direct control
ofinstirutions like the Stock Exchange. 17 Nevertheless, some parts of the
\6 Sec A. Cairncrass) Economic Ideas and Guvernmenr Po/icy. Conm'bun'ons 10 fronom;, His-
tory (1996), ch. 2.
17 For a. contemporary assessment see D. Sachs, 'Survey of the financial institutions of
the Cay of London' l in fnstitu[c of Bankers, Current Financial Problems and the City of
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City still prospered, such as City accountants and solicitors involved in
the nationalisation programme, or the Uoyds insurance market, which
retained an international business.
With the election of the Conservatives in 1951 the relationship between
the City and the government again became more complex. The Con-
servatives abandoned many of the controls introduced by the preced-
ing Labour government, as with the ending of rationing in 1954. This
coincided with a growing liberaJisation in global trade and finance that
gradually restored a role to markets in the pricing and movement of
goods and money. The result was a City revival on both the domestic
and international fronts. Moreover, the greatly increased involvement of
the government in economic and financial maners during the I940s had
inevitably worked in favour offinancial institutions and businesses located
in London, and against those in previously important financial and com-
mercial centres like uverpool and Glasgow. Many provincially based
businesses had become large nationalised industries run from London
and tapping London's financial and commercial markets and services.
They were followed by the private sector where large public companies
absorbed numerous local concerns through mergers and acquisitions,
leading them to switch their fund-raising activities to the City. The con-
sequence was that in the I950s the City ofLondon acquired a prominence
within the British economy that it had never previously possessed, largely
courtesy of the government. There is no evidence that this outcome was
intended by either party. It was simply an accidental by-product of gov-
ernment action which encouraged the centralisation ofso much economic
decision-making in London.
In addition the City still remained a financial centre of major impor-
tance within the world economy, though now eclipsed by New York. The
continued existence ofboth the British empire and the sterling area helped
to direct commercial and financial flows to London. Potential rival cen-
tres in Europe, such as Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam, had all been bad.Jy
damaged during the war or, in the case of Zurich, had not yet developed
sufficiently really to challenge London. British governments wers ·1tere-
fore faced with an internationally powerful financial centre and one that
was in a strong position within the domestic economy.
Such a situation was ofsignificance for the government because, despite
the change of political party in power, it was still commined to man-
aging the economy. The Conservatives did not dismantle the appara-
tus of state ownership and control established by Labour in the postwar
London (1949). Sec also j. Fforde, The Bank of Eng/and and Pub/if: l'v/icy, 194/-1958
(Cambridge J 1992); it is no accident that Fforde's title includes me words 'and public
policy' .
42 Ra'Jald Michie
years. With a few exceptions like steel, those industries nationalised by
Labour remained so under successive Conservative governments from
1951 to 1964. Similarly, the Conservatives kept monetary and fiscal con-
trols inherited from Labour. Public expenditure as a share of national
expenditure, which stood at 37.5 per cent when Labour lost power in
1951, was 38.9 per cent in 1964, the year Labour returned to power. IS
The Conservative government maintained exchange and import controls,
which protected British manufacturing and agriculrure from foreign com-
petition, but which also restricted British investors and British banks to
placing their funds with domestic borrowers like the government itself
or the growing number of companies tapping the London capital mar-
ket. Large swathes of the economy remained under state ownership, the
Bank of England could tighten or ease credit whenever the government
required, and the freedom of the capital market to operate globally was
circumscribed by exchange controls. 19
Under these circumstances City financiers began to map out a new
future designed to meet the financial needs of the British government and
British business within the limits set by government. The London clearing
banks co-operated in controlling the supply of credit and in return gained
official support for their interest-rate cartel. The discount houses enjoyed
a stable business as intermediaries in the market for short- and long-
term government debt. The Stock Exchange became the quasi-official
regulator of the securities market and its members were able to charge
fixed commissions with impunity. During the 1950s a significant part of
the City therefore became dependent upon either government business
or protection for its livelihood20 The government decided what was in
the national interest and expected the City to adhere to its agenda. As a
result, relations between the Conservative government and the City were
not always amicable. In 1960 the Prime Minister, Macmillan, lamented
'the very unsatisfactory relations between the Treasury, the Bank, and
what is roughly called the City, especially the Clearing Banks' 21
Nevertheless, in the 1950s there appears to have been a high degree
of co-operation, an almost unwritten pact, between the City and the
government. The City delivered the control over the money and capi-
tal markets required by the government, and received in return general
stability and a guarantee of income not normally existing under volatile
or competitive trading conditions. Such a pact was the product not of
18 Middleton, GovemmenI venus the Marlul, p. 91.
19 For this era sec Robcns, 'City of London'.
20 M. Moran, The Po/iu"cs of Banking. The Strange GQJe of Competition and Credit Control
(1984), pp. 16-23. .
21 Quoted in Kynaston. Ciry of unuion, IV. p. 2S I.
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City influence over a Conservative government but rather of mutual self-
interest. 22 However, domestically, this government-City pact extended
only as far as the major banks and discount houses, marshalled by the
Bank ofEngland, and the major brokers and dealers of the securities mar-
ket, controlled by the Stock Exchange. Other individuals and businesses
who were not subjected to controls or not members of any cartel were
eager to gain at their expense. The provincially based building societies
are the classic example, as they were able to offer more competitive rates
than the banks and so attracted a growing share ofdeposits. 23 The mech-
anisms of control that had worked during and immediately after a world
war were increasingly ineffective when what was needed was the ability to
respond to a rapidly changing market place, requiring not a centralised
bureaucracy but a devolved customer-focused strategy24
This was also true internationally. To succeed in managing the econ-
omy the government had to ensure that Britain remained relatively iso-
lated from the rest of the world, otherwise the markets both for goods and
services and for money and capital would be responsive not to the wishes
of the British government but to global supply and demand. Tne moves
towards liberalisation in world trade and finance which took place in the
1950s jeopardised the effectiveness of the government's own controls,
requiring it to become more interventionist in order to achieve its objec-
tives. Government restrictions on the use ofsterling in the finance ofworld
trade, as well as in the issuing offoreign loans in London, imposed to pro-
tect an internationally weak currency, hampered the City's re-emergence
as a global financial centre. The need to intervene in the domestic finan-
cial markets, in order to support the external value of sterling, hampered
business in the City. There is a historical belief that the future of the
City as a financial centre was tied to the value of sterling and that it
was therefore the City above all that opposed devaluation, which could
have improved the international competitiveness of British manufactur-
ing industry.25 However, ifany particular group in the City had influence
over government policy in the 1950s it was those leading commercial
bankers, merchant bankers and stockbrokers whose interests were largely
focused on domestic business. In contrast the international bankers in the
22 For a conu:mpomry overview of the City in lhe 1950s sec P. Bareau, 'The [manaal
institutions of the City of London', in Institute of Bankers, The City ofLondon as a Centre
of Inl£rnaNollal Trade and Finance (1961).
23 For this and other aspects of money and banking see the authoritative account, M.
Collins, Money and Bankl"ng in the United }U'ngdom: a History (1988).
2-1 See G. Morgan and A. Sturdy, Beyond Organizational Change: StrUClure, Discourse and
fu.oer in UK Finandal Sennas (2000), pp. 80-2.
25 Sec S. Pollard, TJu W~sring of vIe Bn"tish Economy. Bn'lisll Eamomic Policy 1945 w che
fusem (1982), pp. 35, 71-3, 85-6, 185.
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City possessed little influence, even being excluded from membership
of the British Bankers' Association until 1972.26 Detailed examination "l
of the policy-making process leading to the Conservative government's
commitment to maintain the external value ofsterling berween 1951 and
1964 has recently revealed how marginal was City influence as compared
to that of politicians and civil servants. The policy was tied up not only
with the maintenance of the sterling area, but also with relations with
the Commonwealth, Britain's international position, prestige among the
world community and numerous other disparate beliefs and interests. To
see the commitment to sterling as driven solely by City interests can no
longer be sustained in the face of the mounting evidence otherwise. 27
Consequently, by the early 1960s many in the City saw limited ben-
efits in abiding by the controls imposed through the Bank of England
or the Stock Exchange. Inevitably, this produced tensions with the gov-
ernment, and the unwritten pact began to break down even before the
Labour election victory of 1964. Changes in the composition of the City
also weakened government ability to make its policies effective. From
1960 onwards, restrictions imposed by the government of the United
States on its banks and financial markets in order to protect the exter-
nal value of the dollar drove international business abroad, with London
becoming the preferred location of most because of ties of language, law
and convenience. Increasingly the City was populated by foreign banks
and brokerage houses over which neither the Bank of England nor the
Stock Exchange had any authority. The Bank saw no problem with this
development as its focus was on the domestic financial system and on
sterling, and these firms, though based in the City, conducted their busi-
ness in US dollars on behalf of non-British clients. The government even
saw benefits in terms of jobs and taxes28
Hence it was underlying changes within the City itself that led to its dif-
ficult relationship with the new Labour government, rather than simple
opposition to a socialist government or a traditional antagonism berween
a right-leaning City and a left-leaning government29 Until the 1966 gen-
eral election the Labour party did not possess a sufficient majority in
26 V. Sandclson, 'The confidence trick', in H. Thomas, The ESlab/ishmenl (J 959),
pp. 117-18, 126-8, 131, 134--6; A. Gleeson, London Enriched: the Development of the
Foreign Banking Community in the City over Five Decades (1997) pp 29 48 82 108116. I • I I I ,
27 G. Krozc~ski, Money and .the End 0/ Empire: Bn'tish International &onomic Po/icy and
the Colomes. 1947-58 (Basmgstokc, 2001), pp. 160-5; KynasIon, City of London, IV,
pp. 300-1.
28 For these years sec S. BaniJosssi and Y. Cassis (cds.), European Banks and the Ameriwn
Challenge: European Banking wider Bretton Wbods (Oxford 2002).
29 E.g: A., Sampson, TJ:e Anatonry of Bn'lain Today (1965) p. 395) for the City's mood
haVIng degenerated mto a selfish and destructive sulk'.
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Parliament to follow any different policy regarding the City. Even with a
large majority thereafter, little changed. There was no wholesale policy of
nationalisation. The relatively modest devaluation of sterling in J967 did
not represent any major shift in the government-eity relationship akin to
the departure from the gold standard in 193 J. Rather, in the J960s there
increasingly existed two Cities. A new City was developing in response
to the growing international Eurodollar and Eurobond markets located
in London because of the restrictions placed on New York. It was heavily
dominated by foreign banks, with those from the United States rapidly
joined by others from Japan and continental Europe. Some British firms
were involved, such as the Midland Bank and Warburgs, but business was
largely driven by those from abroad. This part of the City was closely inte-
grated into the international financial system and WalP concerned with the
domestic situation in Britain only in a tangential way, through the con-
sequences of government policy for Britain's standing in international
markets and on exchange and interest rates. 30
To this part of the City the whole issue of sterling or Britain's balance
of payments crises was a sideshow. It was little interested in British gov-
ernment policy as long as business was not harmed. In contrast the older
City remained more direcdy concerned with British government policy
for management of the economy and with the consequences for inflation,
corporate profits, interest rates, and taxation of income and capital. The
liquidation of foreign investments combined with restrictions on over-
seas business by post-I 945 governments had forced many in the City to
orientate their entire business towards the issue of securities on behalf
of British companies, organising mergers between these companies, and
trading and investing in their stocks and shares. However, little evidence
has been produced to suggest that this part of the City either tried to influ-
ence policy-making or was successful in doing so. Despite the continuing
fear, especially with a Labour government in power, that resistance would
be followed by even more intrusive measures, even nationalisation, the
Bank of England and the City managed to preserve their self-regulatory,
autonomous, status. As financial business of all kinds flourished, the City
had little reason to oppose the government or seriously resist its policies
in the 1960s.
By the beginning of the 1970s a new City of London had therefore
emerged. The externally orientated, foreign-owned component was well
established and flourished as long it was left alone by the authorities. Its
currency was increasingly the US dollar rather than the British pound.
30 For this sec C. R. Schenk, 'The origins ofthe Eurodollar markel in London) 1955-1963' J
Exploron"ons in Economic Hiswry 35 (1998), 221-38; R. Fry (cd.), A Bonker', lfbrld: w
Revival of tht City, 1957-1970 (1970).
46 Ra7lald Michie
No longer did the fate of sterling as an international currency and that
of the City of London as an international financial centre appear to be
inextricably linked. The City had little reason to try and influence the
government in favour of maintaining the external value of sterling, long
before the attempt was finally abandoned in the 1970s.31 The Labour gov-
ernment chose not to intervene in the City, not through any City pressure
but because events on the international financial front appeared to have
little relevance to the domestic siruation. For example, the Eurodollar
market emerged 'out of a non-regulatory vacuum in the City'. 32 In the
1970s, both Labour and Conservative governments recognised that it was
not the City itself that determined the external value of sterling but the
reaction of global markets to British balance-of-payments crises, budget
deficits, industrial unrest or political instability. Intervention was ineffec-
rual and unnecessary. The Bank ofEngland was left to supervise and mon-
itor these new developments without regard to a political agenda. 33 The
arm's-length supervisory system proved a major advantage for Britain at
a time when bankers and brokers from across the world were trying to
escape the clutches of national authorities and to relocate where the rules
of orderly market behaviour would be both respected and enforced.
The evolved City of London was thus ideally placed to profit from
the international financial instability of the 1970s. It was able to provide
the money and capital markets required after the collapse of coordinated
central bank control. As a financial centre with extensive international
connections and well-established financial systems it was able to respond
to such global financial problems as the need to recycle surplus funds from
oil-rich countries to those with large deficits. For the City to emerge as the
premier international financial centre it was necessary only for the British
government not to impose new controls and restrictions that would drive
potential business elsewhere. Even had the Government been inclined to
take such action, its freedom to do so internationally was circumscribed
by past agreements on the liberalisation of global trade and finance and
then by accession to the European Economic Community in 1973.34
Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Government-City relation-
ship had become merely regulatory, conducted through the mediation
of the Bank of England. Both Labour and Conservative governments in
31 Kynaslon, Ciry of London, IV, pp. 361, 395-6.
32 G. Burn, 'The state. the City and the Euromarkcls·. Review of lm.ernao"onol Poliu'cal
Economy 6 (1999), 236.
33 R. Shaw, 'London as a financial CCntTC', rcpr. in R. C. Michie (cd.), 77,e Development of
34 Lo"d01~ as a ~i"anda/ Cemrc, 4 \'015. (2000), rv, pp. 131-2.
For thIS penod sec S. F. Frowen (ed.). A Framework of lnrernational Banking (l979)j
also R. Roberts and D. Kynaslon, CilY State. How the Markers Came to Rule Our Wbrld
(200 I).
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the 1970s remained commined to managing the British economy, to a
lesser Or greater degree, and that meant exercising conrrol over the City.
In rum those in the City undertaking domestic business had a vested
interest in crying to influence government policy. In 1970 the new Con-
servative government was keen to inrroduce more effective conrrols over
the banking system to contain the growth of fringe banks, hire-purchase
companies and alternative money markets. At the same time the resuic-
tive practices operated by the major banks, especially on interest rates, had
anracted the scrutiny of such bodies as the National Board for Prices and
Incomes and the Monopolies Commission. The 'competition and credit
conrrol' policy introduced in 1971 aimed simultaneously to encourage
competition among all types of banks and to conrrol the availability and
cost of credit. In rerrospeet this appears an impossible task, particularly
in a period of growing inflation and indusuial unrest in Britain and of
international financial instability related especially to the weakness of the
dollar and the price of oil. The result was a rapid monetary expansion
in Britain culminating in a financial crisis in 1974. The Bank of England
had to intervene in order to prevent a massive financial collapse, forcing
the major banks to support the rescue of a large number of fringe banks,
who had been their competitors. By March 1975 a total of £ 1.2 billion
had been provided. Credit conrrols were re-imposed and the Bank took a
more interventionist attitude towards banking supervision, as it could no
longer rely upon a close relationship with the major banks to resuiet the
availability of credit. The Banking Act of 1979 established more formal
supervision of the entire banking sector, including for the first time the
numerous foreign banks located in London. Illustrating the complexity
of the task the Bank of England faced was the fact that 538 firms applied
to become either recognised banks or licensed deposit takers - in conrrast
to previous recognition of merely the five major British retail banks.3S
The primary concern ofboth the government and the City in the 1970s
was the state of the public finances. As government borrowing escalated
in the mid 1970s, as a result of worsening domestic economic problems
and ballooning inflation, the Labour government of 1974-9 faced real
difficulties in obtaining sufficient funds to finance its budget deficits. A
budget surplus in 1970 equivalent to 3.4 per cent of GNP had become a
deficit of 3 per cent of GNP in 1973. That deficit then rose to a peak of
5.4 per cent ofGNP in 1976 and, though it fell thereafter, the government
never managed to balance its finances for rest of the decade. Almost for
the first time, there appeared to be a lack of confidence among potential
35 Fo... this episode see Moran, Polilics of Ba"king. The figure of £ 1.2 billion comes from
Morgan and Sturdy, Beyond Organi::an"onal Change, p. 84.
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lenders in the British government's ability to service its debts. Although
the government was always able to raise the required funds, it had to
pay higher rates of interest than previously and tailor its borrowing more
to the needs of potential lenders and investors. 36 During the 1970s the
quoted National Debt rose by £53 billion in nominal terms - although
the rise in the market value was only £45 billion, indicating the suspicion
of institutional investors at home and abroad. In 1976 the Labour govern-
ment had to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund and
accept the conditions anached, so perilous was its financial position. 37
In many ways these years represented a watershed in the post-Second
World War government-City relationship. Prior to the mid 1970s a
working relationship had existed from which, on the whole, both sides
gained. Despite some unhappiness with the direction of policy and level
of taxation, many in the City worked with successive governments, help-
ing them to achieve their policy ambitions. However, in the 1974 Labour
government they faced an antagonistic administration unable to deliver
either stable finances or a steady growth in prosperity. Long-standing
frustrations with government policy, whether Labour or Conservative,
came to the fore particularly in that part of the City which relied almost
entirely upon the British economy for its business and was suffering as
a result of unstable economic, financial and monetary conditions. 38 In
the financial crisis of 1974 many in the City not only experienced falling
incomes but also lost their livelihood. There was a contraction of over
40QO, or 31 per cent, in the number of staff employed by London-based
members of the Stock Exchange during that year. In contrast, that part of
the City that largely conducted its business abroad faced little in the way
of controls and prospered in the volatile international conditions of the
time. 39 The number of foreign banks with London branches expanded
rapidly as did turnover in a wide range of financial markets. The very
difficulties experienced by British industry and the resurgence of activity
in the City ofLondon were connected, but not to each other. Rather, they
were both consequences of the collapse of the golden age of the world
economy.40
Jo C. Goodhart, I Monetary policy and debt management in the United Kingdom: some
ruslOrica1 viewpoints" in K. A. Chrystal (cd.), Government Debe Srrw:ture and Moneta')'
C""diaons (Bank of England 1999), pp. 60-1 and Annex 2.
37 Kynaston, CiryofLondon, N, ch. 17; R C. Michie, The London Srock Exchange. A Hisrory
(Oxford, 1999), ch. II.
18 For a notably outspoken arrack on government imerfcrence and lack of direction, see
39 London Stock Exchange, Council Minutes, July 1975.
Gleeson, London Enrit:hed, pp. 82-91.
40 See R. ~ringl~1 'Financial markets versus governments', in T. Banuli and j. S. Sdlor
(OOs.), FmanaOJ Openmss and Nan'onal Autonomy: Opportunities and ConstTal~nu(Oxford,
1992), pp. 89-101.
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The government still expected the Bank of England both to regulate
and control British banks, and the Stock Exchange to do the same for the
securities market, although it could not guarantee the privileges expected
in return, such as a monopoly of the domestic market. This was pre-
vented by the increasingly competitive nature of the financial markets
and by attacks on restrictive practices and price-fixing cartels from the
government's own creations - the Monopolies Commission, the Office
of Fair Trading and the Restrictive Practices Court. In the 1970s, these
bodies had already forced changes in the way banks operated, creating
a much more competitive environment. Now their attention, and that
of a hostile press, switched increasingly to the restrictive practices of the
Stock Exchange. Even in the City the Stock Exchange was under pres-
sure because many institutional investors regarded the charges levied by
its members as excessive, while the Bank of England feared that lack
of change in the Stock Exchange would hamper London's competitive
position as an international financial centre4J Consequently, the bene-
fits to the City from any relationship with the government appeared to be
fading during the 19705. Many blamed the City for Britain's economic
difficulties, identifying it with the international money and capital mar-
kets. Consequently in 1977 the Labour government appointed a com-
mittee to examine the working of the whole British financial system, to
be conducted by the ex-Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, wbo was
known for his anti-City views.42 It was with relief that the City saw the
defeat of Labour in the general election of 1979, and its replacement with
a Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher.
The end of the affair: City and government since 1979
One of the first acts of the new Conservative government was to abandon
exchange controls. This was unexpected and does not appear to have been
a result of any City pressure. There was now no division between domes-
tic and international business as long as it was sufficiently large to attract
an international provider. Lending and borrowing, buying and selling,
merging and acquiring could be undertaken not only by a foreign bank
or broker located in London but also routed via a foreign financial centre
like New York or Paris. City institutions which under the exchange con-
trols had been able to monopolise domestic business and impose charges
and uncompetitive practices now found themselves in the same posi-
tion as British industry, which had been progressively exposed to foreign
41 Sec Michic, London Stock Exdumge, ch. II.
42 Comminee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions.
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competition under successive rounds of GATf negotiations and then by
membership of the European Economic Community. Such a move was
a boon to that part of the City which serviced the world economy, but
in the domestic market British firms now had to compete on the same
terms as rival foreign banks and brokers located in London. This move
was a pragmatic response by government to the impossibility of policing
exchange control effectively, without any real appreciation of the conse-
quences for the City. It destroyed the separation that had existed since
the 1960s between that part of the City conducting an external business
and that which conducted an internal business.43
As the banks and the money market had already been forced to
make adjustments in order to survive in this more competitive environ-
ment, it was the Stock Exchange which found itself most exposed as a
result. Whereas exchange controls had enabled the members of the Stock
Exchange to monopolise the business generated by British investors buy-
ing and selling the domestic securities issued by British companies, they
could not do so in international securities, even if issued by British com-
panies. Instead, that market developed separately from the London Stock
Exchange and had by the late 1970s become extremely active, with no
fixed charges or controls on participation. In addition to these newly
unleashed competitive pressures was the unresolved issue of the case
against the Stock Exchange by the Restrictive Practices Court, which
had been in progress since the early 1970s. Despite expectations that
the Thatcher government would drop the case, this did not happen. The
Conservatives proved equally unwilling to grant the Stock Exchange the
immunity from prosecution necessary to safeguard its restrictive prac-
tices. The case therefore dragged on until after the Conservative victory
in the 1983 election, when the government and the Stock Exchange even-
tually reached agreement that restrictive practices would be abandoned.
The only concession that the Council of the Stock Exchange gained was
the time to prepare for this more competitive future. It was given until
1986, and the event known as 'Big Bang'H
'Big Bang' indicates two central aspects ofgovernment-City relations at
the time. The first is that the Conservative government gave a higher pri-
ority to making the economy, including the financial services sector, more
competitive than it did to bolstering restrictive practices, even though
these were integral to the way that government itself exerted control over
43 For the Ci[)' in the 19805 sec Bank of England, 'London as an international fmancial
centre', Bank oj England Qua,..lerJ.>, Ret,,"ew 29 (1989).
H By this, the Stock Exchange lost its power to fix the charges levied by its members, to
rc~la[c the way they conducted their business, and 10 exclude the panicipatlon of both
Bfltlsh banks and foreign firms,
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the City. In future, that control would be exercised through legislation
and statutory bodies. The cosy relationship forged in the heat of war and
reconstruction in the 1940s was now at an end. The second aspect is the
attitude of those in the City to the government of the day, irrespective
of whether it was Conservative or Labour. Despite disappointment with
government policy among many members of the Stock Exchange, they
were minded to accept the 1983 deal rather than continue lobbying or take
their chances with the Restrictive Practices Court.45 Such was the com-
plexity and speed offinancial markets that the worst possible outcome for
the City was one where politicians could interfere in their daily operation.
Preventing this was the absolute priority of virtually all in the City, and
it overrode any other conside.ration or divisions berween them. Some in
the City saw 'Big Bang' as an act ofbetrayal by the Conservative govern-
ment because it led to the takeover of British-owned financial firms by
foreign banks, running counter to the once legitimate expectation that the
British government would favour national over foreign firms in the City
ofLondon.46 The City's development as an international financial centre
from the 1960s meant that towards the end of the century around one
third of City employment was in branches of the foreign banks and other
financial firms located there, while much of the activity in Bri tish firms
was also externally focused, whether through City lawyers and accoun-
tants or banks, brokers and fund managers. Under these circumstances
a policy of discrimination by the government would have resulted sim-
ply in the migration of foreign firms to other locations, if the situation
became intolerable, resulting in the loss of employment and income for
the British economy. Such a scenario was increasingly recognised by the
government47
Instead, what the British government could do was to provide the reg-
ulatory framework within which the City operated. The Bank of England
had long been developing closer working relationships with the foreign
banks located in the City. As early as 1947 the Bank was involved in the
creation of a Foreign Bankers' Association in London, which acted as a
conduit for its dealings with these banks. The Banking Act of 1979 gave
the Bank of England the statutory power to authorise, or not, foreign
banks wanting to establish a London branch. In 1981, in response to
demands to be treated the same as domestic banks in all respects, for-
eign banks were given the same re-discounting facilities at the Bank of
H London Stock Exchange, Council Minutes, 21-22 July 1983. Sec also Michie, London
Srock Exchange, ch. 12.
46 Sec, for example, the merchant banker P. Augar, The Dearh of Gcncumanly CapicaJism.
The Riu and FaD of London·, lm:.,mrenl Banks (2000), p. 312.
47 N. Buck (cd.), U:Orking CapiwL· Life and Lobour in Conumporo,,· Low/on (2002), p. 112.
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England.48 What changed more radically in the 1980s was the extension
of statutory regulation to other aspects of the City. Accompanying 'Big
Bang', for example, was a replacement of the Stock Exchange as the regu-
latory authority for the securities market by the Securities and Investment
Board. This recognised that the financial activities taking place in the City
now extended far beyond banking, supervised by the Bank of England,
and investment, over which the Stock Exchange had authority. Trad-
ing in securities now encompassed the growing Eurobond market over
which the Stock Exchange had no control. Thus in the 1980s the City-
government relationship became a technical one between a regulator and
the regulated. As the government had no need to borrow at this time, with
tax income boosted by privatisation receipts, and interest and exchange
rates largely left to market forces, there was much less need for it to try and
control the City. Conversely, the City was so much more international in
terms of ownership and business that what the British government did
was largely irrelevant, unless it had a direct impact through high personal
taxes or excessive regulation. Moreover, institutions were more vulner-
able to the demands of their shareholders than to those of government,
making it increasingly unlikely that they would readily co-operate.49
Recognition that the City and government were operating in a very
different financial world was underlined when the Labour party returned
to power in 1997. As one of its first acts the Blair government gave inde-
pendence to the Bank of England in setting interest rates, a move con-
sidered but not implemented by the Conservatives. Henceforth the set-
ting of interest rates and the control of inflation were determined by an
independent monetary policy corntninee rather than by the political or
economic judgement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This move by
the Labour government, undertaken not because of City pressure but for
political reasons, represented a further transformation in the balance of
power between the City and the government. As long as the government
retained the power to set interest rates it could exert a direct influence
over the money and capital markets, which made its actions important to
the City, and thus encouraged it to try and exert political influence. Once
that power was given away, the government's direct influence evaporated.
Instead, its power over the City now rested with the regulatory framework
under which the City operated. With the creation ofthe Financial Services
Authority, which became the single regulator for the whole financial ser-
vices sector in December 200 I, the Labour government entrusted that
power to a statutory body operating independently from government.
48 Gleeson, London EPlmhed, pp. 37-9, 88-91 116 12249 I I .
Morgan and Sturdy, Beyond Organizational Change, p. 102.
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Though the City might complain about the costs and complexities of
regulation, it could be confident that regulation was being conducted
impartially and provided an orderly and stable environment. 50 Though
the government was stiu able to affeer the City ofLondon through legisla-
tion and taxes, it no longer possessed the power to determine the lending
policies of banks or the conduct of the Stock Exchange. All that the gov-
ernment retained for itself was an emergency power to intervene in the
City, including the ability to run banks and markets, in the event of a
national crisis such as might result from a terrorist arrack. This reflected
prudence rather than a desire for control. By then all recognised that
the City of London was too valuable a resource to lose, for whatever
cause. 51
That is not to say that the relationship between the City and the gov-
ernment was now simply a technical one, focusing on regulation and
tax. Questions continued to be raised about the extent and direction of
influence. The unexpeered re-nationalisation ofRailtrack without consul-
tation or compensation in October 200 I could be seen as a defeat for City
interests, suggesting that they possessed little real power. 52 Conversely,
the extraction of £7-8 billion in compensation from the government in
March 2003, after prolonged private and public lobbying by institutional
investors, suggested that the anonymous fund managers in the City were
not without power. 53 Given that the government's costs of borrowing in
financial markets had risen because of the Railtrack episode, as state guar-
antees were now in doubt, the government had little alternative but to
negotiate a settlement and reduce the perceived risk ifit wanted to borrow
more cheaply in the future. Either way the City coped with the situation
it found itself in. 54 In the case of Railtrack the City was able to force
the government to change its policy by exerting influence through the
market, and with the government needing to borrow or sell state assets it
could not ignore this pressure. Conversely, in areas where the City could
not exert any such influence the government was able to ignore City pres-
sure. Such was the CaSe with the annual City campaign to have the stamp
duty on share dealings reduced or abolished. As such a step was likely
to cost the government around £3-4 billion in tax revenues, and there
was no obvious or immediate gain, apart from that to the international
competitiveness of the Stock Exchange, City pressure proved fruitless. 55
50 Financial Times, 30 Nov. 200 1. 51 Ibid., 26 Feb. 2003.
52 Ibid., passim for Oct. 200 I.
" Ibid., 25 March 2002. For the background see ibid., 26 March 2002.
,. Ibid., 7 March 2002.
" Ibid., 22 Oct. 200 I, 8 Feb. 2003. See also Michie, Londbn Stock ExdIange.
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On wider economic and political issues it is difficult to identify either
a 'City view' or any concerted City pressure to achieve a particular end.
This can be seen most clearly on the important question of whether or
nor Britain should join the single European currency, even though, by
any measure or calculation, replacing sterling with the euro appears to be
in the interests of the City. Though the creation of the euro has had no
discernible impact on the City of London as a financial centre, the threat
existed that ifBritain did nor join the single European· currency, financial
activity within Europe would gravitate elsewhere, such as Frankfurt or
Paris, and non-European business would then follow. However, neither
the Labour government since 1997, nor the Conservative opposition,
has expressed any commitment to take Britain into the euro. The inter-
ests of the City were clearly peripheral to both parties, as compared to
the wider political and economic considerations which determined the
decisions taken by government. Conversely, within the City, such was
the global nature of business and the importance of the dollar in so
many transactions, that the debate on the euro was of rather marginal
significance. What marrered in the City was the freedom to operate in
any currency and in any market in the ways that best suited the partici-
pants. The City was becoming less concerned with the actions of the
British government and more with those of foreign governments on deci-
sions regarding such marrers as banking solvency and market regulations.
Under these circumstances the British government emerged as a defender
of the interests of rhe City of London in competition with other financial
centres, each supported by the interests of their own governments. This
was nor rhe product of City influence over government policy, but was
driven by simple national self-interest. 56 Whereas for much of the twen-
tieth century governments interpreted self-interest as meaning using the
institutions and markets of the City to manage the economy and support
manufacturing, by rhe end of rhe century rhere was a general recognition
rhat the City was a major industry in its own right, and needed protection
against unfair foreign competition.
Conclusion
By rhe end of the twentieth century governments of all political per-
suasions had come to recognise the difficulty, even impossibility, of
controlling international financial markets. 57 In some ways, this situa-
tion was reminiscent of that at the beginning of the century, with the
56 Financial Times, 3 May, 10 June, 25 June 2003.
57 Kynaston, City of Lcndon, IV, p. 791.
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interests of national governments circumscribed through the power of
global markets, as represented by the Ciry of London. The history of
government-Ciry relations in the rwentieth century suggests that in the
debate over whether markets or governments served the interests of
people best the matter is far too complicated to be reduced to a simple
answer in favour of one or the other. At times it was absolutely essen-
tial for the government to intervene in the City, as with the outbreak of
the First World War and during the I 940s. There were also times when
greater intervention was necessary, as in the aftermath of the First World
War and the world economic collapse of 1929-32. Conversely, there were
other times when government intervention did not prove helpful, distort-
ing the economy and producing a sub-optimal solution. This was true
in the return to the gold standard in 1925 and the controls over the
financial system in place berween 1950 and 1979. Though British politi-
cians may have succeeded in persuading their public that responsibiliry
for the country's econonllc failure rested with the Ciry of London, the
slow unravelling of the historical record produces a somewhat different
conclusion, and one that is not particularly favourable to government.
Only when all the evidence is to hand on how the government reached its
decisions, and why, is it possible to distribute responsibiliry. Even then it
is vital to understand the concerns of both the government and the Ciry,
recognising that neither was wholly united in their aims and that these
aims changed enormously over time.
